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Abstract: To find the possible equilibrium states of forest ecosystems one are suggested
to use the theory of differential games. At within the 4-tier model of mosaic forest
communities it established the existence of the Nash equilibrium states in such ecosys-
tems.
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1 Introduction
As a rule, the stationary equilibrium state
of the system, or stationary equilibrium, is
stationary state for which characterizing its
parameter x(t) does not change with time,
i. e.
dx
dt
= 0.
However, the systems are often controlled
by external factors u1, ..., uN , and in fact
their dynamics is described by the differen-
tial equation of the form
dx
dt
= f(t, x, u1, ..., uN ).
In this case, it can consider this equation in
the framework of optimal control theory, and
moreover, in the framework of the theory dif-
ferential games, and to find the so-called the
Nash equilibrium.
In the theory of differential games each
controlling factor ui is considered to be in
possession of the player i who tries to use
it to affect the system so to have a max-
imal winning or minimal losing. Player’s
wining/lossing is described some given func-
tion Ji(x, u1, ..., uN ). Clearly, in reality, it
is difficult to suggests that the factors can
be changed completely independently from
each other, and therefore, in the system can
be installed in some sense of equilibrium.
Nash equilibrium in this case means
that if each player is trying to unilater-
ally change their management strategy in
the while other players policy remains un-
changed, it has the worst record (greater
loss).
Forest ecosystem dynamics can also be
described by the differential equation with
external control factors. As external control-
ling factors may be considered such charac-
teristics of forest communities as a mosaic
state m, interspecific and intraspecific com-
petition k, the impact of the anthropogenic
a and soil moisture w.
It is natural to try to establish the ex-
istence of Nash equilibrium in forest ecosys-
tems with external control factors k,m, a,w.
2 Model of 4-tier mosaic for-
est
In [1, 2] was offered the next model 4-tier
mosaic forest communities, characterized by
productivity x:
dx
dt
= −
∂
∂x
V (x, k,m, a,w), (1)
where
V (x, k,m, a,w) =
=
α
6
x6 + kx4 +mx3 + ax2 + wx, (2)
α = α1α2α3α4 = const > 0 are tiers of forest.
In [2] a stationary equilibriums of this
ecosystem is completely studied in detail.
Below we examine Nash equilibriums
and install them the existence for a 4-tier
mosaic forest ecosystem.
3 Stationary equilibriums of
trier mosaic forest
Stationary equilibriums x = x(k,m, a,m)
of trier mosaic forest we find by solving the
equation
∂
∂x
V (x, k,m, a,w) = 0. (3)
Consider the set
MV = {(x, k,m, a,w) :
∂
∂x
V =
= 6x5 + 4kx3 + 3mx2 + 2ax+ w = 0},
which is contains of maximums, mini-
mums and points of inflection of function
V(k,m,a,w)(x) = V (x, k,m, a,w). All these
poins are stationary equilibriums of given
forest ecosystem.
We can change the factors (k,m, a,w)
and to get different stationary equilibriums.
In some cases the transition from one equi-
librium to another is jump x(k,m, a,w) →
(k′,m′, a′, w′), which is called butterfly catas-
trophe.
The behavior of the forest ecosystem in
such catastrophes is investigated in [2].
We shall study behavior of the forest
ecosystem under the Nash equilibriums.
4 The algorithm for finding
Nash equilibriums
It is natural to consider the differential game
with zero sum, because ”winnings” of our
players are poorly connected.
If a player forms its control action in
the form of only time function u(t) for the
whole duration of the game, then u(t) is pro-
gram control. However, the player may se-
lect its control depending on the position x
at time t of system. In this case, the player
constructs a control action as a function of
u(t, x), which already dependent on the po-
sition {t, x}, and for u(t, x) is used the term
positional control [3]. Often we simply write
u(x).
We will look for positional control, posi-
tional Nash equilibrium.
For differential game with N players
dx
dt
= f(x) +
N∑
j=1
gj(x)uj , f(0) = 0,
x ∈ IR, uj ∈ IR,
Ji(x, u1, ..., uN ) =
+∞∫
0
[Qi(x)+
N∑
j=1
Rij(uj)
2]dt,
(i = 1, ..., N),
Qi > 0, Rii > 0, Rij ≥ 0,
the existence problem of Nash equilibrium
Ji(u
∗
1, u
∗
2, u
∗
i , ..., u
∗
N ) ≤
J1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2, ..., u
∗
i−1, ui, u
∗
i+1, ..., u
∗
N ), (4)
∀ui, i = 1, ..., N,
is reduced to extremely complex the problem
of finding positive definite solutions Vi(x) >
0 of nonlinear the Hamilton-Jacobi equa-
tions
(Vi)
′
x(x)f(x) +Qi(x)−
−
1
2
(Vi)
′
x
N∑
j=1
[Gj(x)]
2(Rjj)
−1(Vj)
′
x+
+
1
4
N∑
j=1
Rij[gj(x)]
2[(Rjj)
−1]2[(Vj)
′
x]
2 = 0,
(5)
Then positional Nash equilibriums are
u∗i (x) = ui(Vi(x)) = −
1
2
R−1ii gi(x)(Vi)
′
x. (6)
(i = 1, ..., N).
(see [4, Theorem 10.4-2]).
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5 Nash equilibrium of the
forest ecosystem
In our case N = 4, player 1 is competition
of trees u1 = k, player 2 is mosaic factor
u2 = m, player 3 is anthropogenic interfer-
ence u3 = a in the forest ecosystem (defor-
estation, fires, and so on.), and, finally, the
player 3 is soil moisture u4 = w.
Further
f(x) = −αx5, g1(x) = −4x
3,
g2(x) = −3x
2 g3(x) = −2x, g4(x) = −1
and we take
R11 = R22 = R33 = R44 = 1, Rij = 0 (i 6= j).
The Hamilton-Jacobi equations are:
Qi + (Vi)
′
xf(x)−
−
1
2
(Vi)
′
xF (x) +
1
4
[gi(x)]
2[(Vi)
′
x]
2 = 0 (7)
(i = 1, 2, 3, 4),
where
F (x) =
4∑
j=1
[gi(x)]
2(Vi)
′
x.
Assuming that
V1(x) = V2(x) = V3(x) = V4(x) =
1
2
x2 > 0,
we obtain the Hamilton-Jacobi equation in
the form
Q1 = αx
6 + 4x8 + 92x
6 + 2x4 + 12x
2,
Q2 = αx
6 + 8x8 + 49x
6 + 2x4 + 12x
2,
Q3 = αx
6 + 8x8 + 92x
6 + x4 + 12x
2,
Q4 = αx
6 + 8x8 + 92x
6 + 2x4 + 14x
2.
Since all functions Qi are positive definite,
then the Hamilton-Jacobi equations are held
for those features and for functions Vi that
were selected above.
Therefore by Theorem 10.4-2 of [4] we
have a Nash equilibrium
k∗ = 2x4, m∗ =
3
2
x3,
a∗ = x2, w∗ =
1
2
x,
(8)
found by the formulas (6).
We have the following winning / losing
functions:
J1(x, k,m, a,w) =
+∞∫
0
[Q1(x) + k
2]dt,
J2(x, k,m, a,w) =
+∞∫
0
[Q2(x) +m
2]dt,
J3(x, k,m, a,w) =
+∞∫
0
[Q3(x) + a
2]dt,
J4(x, k,m, a,w) =
+∞∫
0
[Q4(x) + w
2]dt,
Productivity x under the Nash equilib-
rium (8) is found by integration of equation
(1)–(2) and is satisfies the equatution
∫
x−1dx
8x6 + (9/2 + α)x4 + 2x2 + 1/2
=
= −t+ C, (9)
where C is constant of integration, or
2 ln(x)−
−
∑
R
(16R2 + 9R+ 2Ra+ 4) ln(x2 −R)
(48R2 + 18R + 4Ra+ 4)
=
= −t+C,
where
R is root of 16Z3+(9+2a)Z2+4Z+1 = 0.
For α = 0, 0007, i. e. for forest with 70%
of upper tier mass of and for 10% in third
others we have the following solution:
2.0 ln(x)− 0.772183 ln(x2 + 0.354611)−
−0.113908 ln((x2+0.103988)2 +0.165435)+
+0.731466 arctan(
0.406737
x2 + 0.103988
) =
= −t+C.
In the case C = −100 this solution is pre-
sented at fig. 1.
We see that over time productivity of
phytocenosis falls. In other words, the for-
est is degraded. But degradation comes no
sooner than 100 years. We have a climax
forest.
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Figure 1: Forest productivity in the condi-
tion of the Nash equilibrium (8).
6 Conclusion
We have shown that it is possible to apply
the theory of differential games to the study
of forest ecosystems. We have shown that in
such ecosystem there exist the Nash equilib-
riums that is installed in the system when
reached some defined mediated the connec-
tion between the external factors affecting
on the productivity of the forest.
As further research is necessary and use-
ful to determine which forests and in some
cases are in Nash equilibrium, and how it is
expressed in terms of the traditional science
on forests and forest ecosystems.
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